Cisco ip phone 8861 running third-party call control (3pcc) software

This hub aggregates every CVE we track for Cisco ip phone 8861 running third-party call control (3pcc) software, a product in the networking infrastructure space. Use it to gauge the current risk picture and drill into individual advisories.

Severity distribution

Monthly trend

The 10 most recently published vulnerabilities affecting Cisco ip phone 8861 running third-party call control (3pcc) software.

• CVE-2020-26141An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adv...6.5May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26142An issue was discovered in the kernel in OpenBSD 6.6. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations treat fragmented frames as full frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network pa...5.3May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26147An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel 5.8.9. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations reassemble fragments even though some of them were sent in plaintext. This vulnerability can be abuse...5.4May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26146An issue was discovered on Samsung Galaxy S3 i9305 4.4.4 devices. The WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations reassemble fragments with non-consecutive packet numbers. An adversary can abuse this to ex...5.3May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26139An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might ...5.3May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26145An issue was discovered on Samsung Galaxy S3 i9305 4.4.4 devices. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept second (or subsequent) broadcast fragments even when sent in plaintext and proc...6.5May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-26140An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can a...6.5May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-24588The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenti...3.5May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-24587The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An...2.6May 11, 2021
• CVE-2020-24586The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connectin...3.5May 11, 2021